Self and Others
To provide a full account of the ability to think “I”-thoughts, we need an explanation of the transition from implicitly self-related information to explicit self-representation. In the previous post,...
View ArticleExpecting Ourselves
Expecting Ourselves? What does it take to be a creature that has some sense of itself as a material being, with its own concerns, encountering a structured and meaningful world? Such a being feels...
View ArticleCFP: Pathologies of Self-Awareness
Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology Guest Editors Alexandre Billon (Université de Lille Nord de France) Francesca Garbarini (Università degli Studi di Torino) Invited Contributors...
View ArticleCFP: Zahavi on Self and Other (Bochum)
Call for Papers and Workshop Announcement Ruhr-Universität Bochum June 20-22, 2016 Prof. Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen): Lectures on Self and Other Dan Zahavi is Professor of Philosophy and...
View ArticleExperiencing Phenomenology: Experiencing Oneself
On Husserl’s picture of the phenomenological method, the phenomenologist must reflect on their own experience. So the practice of phenomenology involves some form of self-awareness. But how exactly...
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Know Thyself
Annalisa Coliva, The Varieties of Self-Knowledge “Know thyself” is the dictum which appeared on the front of the temple in Delphi. But what does that mean and why is it important? Presumably, it means...
View ArticleThe Varieties of Self-Knowledge
Despite their differences, all previously reviewed accounts have something in common. That is, they adhere to monism with respect to self-knowledge. What they all do is focus on one specific instance,...
View ArticleFirst-Personal Self-Knowledge
The extent and interest of third-personal self-knowledge notwithstanding, first-personal self-knowledge too deserves attention. In The Varieties of Self-Knowledge three chapters are devoted to a...
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Awareness of Awareness: The Brentanian Theory
A guiding idea of The Given is that the notion of mental content is essentially rooted in the notion of what is given in experience. In order for something to be given in experience it must be...
View ArticleCFP: The Relational Self
Interdisciplinary Special Issue to appear in TOPOI, an International Journal of Philosophy THE RELATIONAL SELF: BASIC FORMS OF SELF-AWARENESS Editor: Anna CIAUNICA (Institute of Philosophy Porto /...
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Consciousness is something you do
Many parents who look into the eyes of their newborn baby encounter something wonderful, and awe inspiring. There in those eyes they get a glimpse of a new perspective, a new point of view on the...
View ArticleCFP: Selfless Minds: Radical Disruptions of Self-Consciousness
Guest Editors: Thomas Metzinger (Mainz) & Raphaël Millière (Oxford) Editors-in-Chief: Sascha Benjamin Fink (Magdeburg), Wanja Wiese (Mainz), Jennifer Windt (Monash) We invite submissions of...
View ArticleMind the body (1) A most intimate and obscure relation with one’s body
Although introspectively familiar, it is hard to exactly pinpoint the nature of the specific relationship that we have uniquely with our own body. We are aware of our bodily posture, of its...
View ArticleMind the body (2) A phenomenal contrast for bodily ownership
Ten years ago, Susanna Siegel proposed the method of phenomenal contrast in order to determine the type of properties that are represented in perceptual experiences. In brief, do we see only lines and...
View ArticleMind the body (3) What is the experience of bodily ownership?
The claim so far is that it feels different when one is aware that a hand is one’s own and when one is not. Now one needs to explore this phenomenological difference and determine its nature. There...
View ArticleMind the body (4) What kind of first-personal content?
In the previous post, I argued that the feeling of ownership must be conceived of as an affective feeling. But one may wonder whether this affective feeling is not just a side-effect of the feeling of...
View ArticleSymposium on Letheby and Gerrans, “Self unbound: ego dissolution in...
I am delighted to announce the next symposium in our series on articles from Neuroscience of Consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness is an interdisciplinary journal focused on the philosophy and...
View ArticleA Simple Theory of Introspection
This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Today, I’ll discuss the epistemic role of consciousness in introspection. What...
View Article4. The experience of ownership in memory
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter five, the phenomenology of...
View Article1. Structuring the Self, a new metaphysical enterprise
As before, I am very grateful to John for letting me present my work. My new book Structuring the Self (2019, Palgrave Macmillan, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science), did not...
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